INTRODUCTION
Eradication of a disease from a specific geographical area is often the initial goal and justification of an animal health programme. However, once the initial objective has been attained, the goal must shift to exclusion, in order to maintain the animal health situation without undue expense. The regulatory interventions required for eradication often differ from strategies which will cost-effectively exclude the disease. The proposed model uses a risk assessment format to evaluate the appropriateness of programme changes in the transition from an eradication-directed regulatory structure to an exclusion-based framework in an area which has been freed from brucellosis.
This risk assessment procedure applies the IRAS (Import Risk Analysis System)/IRIS (Import Risk Information System) model proposed by Canada and the United States of America (USA) in a joint initiative on import risk analysis. (IRAS is the Canadian version; IRIS is the counterpart system in the USA.) Figure 1 shows the major components of the model.
Derivation of the procedure
The national brucellosis eradication programme in the USA is, in fact, a collection of local programmes, administered by the various states within national guidelines. The national brucellosis eradication programme was modeled by Beal, Kryder, Dietrich, Crawford and Amosson (4, 8, 9) . The models are quite complex and detailed. The purpose of these models was to review the national programme through cost/benefit studies and economic analyses. Highly detailed models of the epidemiology of a disease 
Risk of infection
may allow a more accurate simulation, or a higher degree of confidence in the calculated probabilities. However, such models also require data which may not be available without extensive effort and expense.
The procedure described here was developed to provide decision-makers with another tool to evaluate the probable effects of changes to a programme operated in a limited geographical area. This procedure uses data which are routinely collected and maintained by or accessible to local programme administrators. The process depends on current census data, estimates derived from previous studies, and the epidemiological judgement of local administrators.
One of the first applications of this model was a risk assessment conducted for the livestock health officials of one of the states in the USA by the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), Centers of Epidemiology and Animal Health (2, 3) . Under the national brucellosis eradication programme, this state is classified as a Brucellosis Certified Free State (6) . Certain modifications suggested by a review of the original application have been incorporated into the current version of the model.
Terminology
An "area" in this model was originally one of the states of the United States. However, in a more general sense, it may be any political or geographical entity with the authority to regulate and administer animal health programmes within the boundaries of the area.
The common term "brucellosis-free" has been supplanted in this model by reference to areas as "low risk" (free) or "higher risk" (non-free). Only areas which have had no infected herds for six years or longer and are maintaining certain minimum standards for surveillance, are considered truly "free of disease" and designated as low risk areas in the model. This restriction is based on the observation that some states in the USA, which have been certified free for fewer than six years, have experienced outbreaks of brucellosis after certification. Epidemiological investigation indicated that the outbreaks may have originated within the state, in infected herds which were undetected when the state was certified. States which have maintained a continuous free status for six years or more have traced all subsequent outbreaks to external sources. Therefore, areas not yet qualified to be low risk areas are still assumed to have undetected infection lurking in the population, regardless of whether they have any herds on a quarantine list. The model assigns one undetected infected herd to such areas. These areas, together with those which have herds quarantined for brucellosis, are called non-free or higher risk areas.
Evidence gathering
The model elicits information which is useful in making or justifying a decision about the programme. More information is requested than is needed by the mathematics of the model. The questions are intended to reveal concerns and conditions which may have an impact on the decisions, even though the data may not be directly incorporated into a mathematical formula.
Mathematical formulae and probability calculations
Probability estimates calculated by each component of the model demonstrate the inherent risk that control measures will fail to accomplish their purpose. Important information can be gained by considering independently each of the major components and their constituent parts. The model then calculates a final single probability estimate for the risk of infection. The combined final estimate is a measure of the overall effect of the brucellosis programme under a given set of conditions.
The full potential of the model is realized only when estimates are produced which compare the current programme (the "before" estimate) with the programme as it is expected to be after changes are implemented (the "after" estimate). Comparison of the final "before" and "after" estimates is especially useful when several concurrent changes are contemplated. Examination of both the end result and the individual components underscores the fact that an eradication or control programme consists of coordinated efforts on several fronts which act together to protect the population in an area.
The user needs to remain aware that "estimate" implies a degree of uncertainty in the outcome. The range of uncertainty may be shown by sensitivity analysis (i.e. varying, within reasonable limits, the factors used as input to the model).
DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL

AGENT IMPORTATION FACTOR
The probability of importation of brucellosis is derived from factors related to the following (Table I) There are three cases which this model considers under importation: a) direct importation from a higher risk area b) importation from a low risk area which imports cattle from a higher risk area c) diversion (removal) of feeder heifers (or cows) from feedlots into the breeding population.
Area of origin factors
The areas involved in the calculations are divided into three categories:
a) The "target area" is the subject of the risk assessment and receives animals from other areas (which may be higher risk areas).
b) An "area of origin" is an area from which cattle are received by the target area. If the area of origin is a low risk area, the associated area factor is based on the prevalence of brucellosis in the non-free source areas. Programme structure Pregnancy c) A "source area" is an area from which a low risk (free) area of origin imports cattle, which subsequently may be transported from the low risk area to the target area. The application uses the prevalence of disease in the unrestricted populations of the source area as the "area factor" for the source area.
The "area of origin factor" used by this application is based on disease prevalence in areas of origin, the number of cattle imported by the target area from those areas of origin, and a factor related to the import restrictions of the target area. The model considers only the above three determinants, because they are quantifiable and based on generally available data.
The prevalence of brucellosis represented by quarantined herds in an area of origin is not a primary concern of a target area, as the movement of quarantined cattle is restricted. The presence of brucellosis in the unrestricted population (i.e. infected herds which have not yet been detected) poses the threat. An estimate of the number of undetected herds is made, on the basis of the number of known infected herds.
The "area of origin factor", and thus the "agent importation factor", may be developed at various levels of complexity, as follows:
-separate factors may be derived for each area from which animals are imported -imports may be divided proportionally as coming from higher or lower risk areas, and an area of origin factor is calculated for areas of different classes from which animals are imported -a single factor may be calculated, as though all imports of a certain type (dairy, beef) came from the highest risk area for imports of that type (to create "worst case" scenarios).
The area factor for low risk areas of origin is dependent upon the probability of agent entry into the low risk area from a higher risk source area and the subsequent passage of the infected animal through the area of origin to the target area. If the area of origin is a low risk area, resident infection is assumed to be non-existent; therefore, the only infected animals which might come from this area must have been imported from another area and are being transported on to the target area. The area factor for higher risk areas of origin is based on the prevalence of brucellosis in the area; there is no need to consider another source area, since the prevalence in a higher risk area is a function of all existing conditions, including importation. In either case, the area factor for the area of origin is based on the prevalence of disease in the unrestricted populations of the highest risk area(s) (either the area of origin itself or a source area) serving as a source of infection to the target area.
Commodity factor
The commodity factor represents the probability that an individual imported animal may be a capable carrier of the disease agent. Elements of the commodity factor include the following: age and sex of the animal, vaccination status, pregnancy status if female, intended use, and potential for exposure to the disease agent (Table I ). The intact female bovine is more susceptible than the male to infection with Brucella abortus and represents a greater risk of spreading the disease. The female bovine which has reached puberty is more susceptible to brucellosis than the immature heifer.
Although calfhood vaccination is useful in preventing the disease in an exposed population, a vaccinated heifer may actually constitute a greater risk of introducing the disease into a disease-free population than a non-vaccinated heifer. This may occur due to the fact that vaccination often exempts a younger animal from pre-entry test requirements which could detect latent infection in a non-vaccinated animal.
The potential for exposure to the disease agent of brucellosis may vary in different breeds and under different management practices. For instance, a dairy heifer which is separated from the dam at birth and raised with animals of the same age has a much lower risk of exposure than a heifer which is retained as a replacement animal in a beef herd.
Three categories of use are recognized by the model: dairy, beef breeding and feedlot. Animals for feeding may be of either dairy or beef breeds.
The value of the commodity factor is based on the assumption that all cattle imported into the area are susceptible to the disease and are capable of transmitting the disease to other susceptible animals. For this reason, the number of imported cattle is limited to intact females of breeding age. A standard value is suggested for all three classes of cattle; this value provides for a "worst case" scenario where all imports are susceptible cows which are capable of transmitting the infection to other susceptible cattle, and where any of these cows may have been exposed and become infected prior to importation.
No attempt is made to quantify and incorporate the effect of imported cows being calfhood vaccinates; nor are different levels of exposure considered which might be inherent in the industry of a particular area. Unless regionalization of the prevalence of brucellosis is attempted for the assessment, the commodity factor may also be considered to be uniform across the area of origin.
The primary condition which would lower the commodity factor assigned to a source area or area of origin is a reduced possibility of prior exposure to brucellosis of the cattle imported from that area; i.e. the area of origin is a low risk area which receives cattle only from other low risk areas or certified free herds, or which requires all imports to test negative prior to entry and enforces the isolation of imports from other cattle pending a post-entry test.
Import restrictions
The import policies of the animal health agency in the target area may also affect the probability of the disease agent entering the area. The area regulations may require that imported cattle originate from areas which have a very low prevalence of brucellosis, that the cattle have a pre-entry test, or that the animals be calfhood vaccinates (Table I) . Restricting the origin of imported cattle to areas with lower brucellosis prevalence rates automatically lowers the risk of importing the disease.
Pre-entry testing can be very effective in reducing a risk which is otherwise quite high. However, the effectiveness of pre-entry testing decreases if cows are illegally imported into the area. Generally, cattle in illegal shipments do not meet the pre-entry test requirements and therefore represent a higher risk of introducing brucellosis than legally imported cattle. This risk may be reduced by effective compliance activities which identify illegal shipments and ensure the fulfilment of the pre-entry requirements.
The potentially increased risk from requiring imports to be vaccinates was addressed above, in the discussion of the commodity factor. The risk may also be increased if regulatory officials incorrectly assume that low titres are due to vaccine and fail to impose movement restrictions.
The import restrictions factor requires an estimate of the percentage of susceptible cattle imported each year (probably illegally) without a test, from potentially infected areas. This percentage is used to adjust the probability that even properly tested and legally imported animals could be infected, still escape detection, and be allowed to enter.
EXPOSURE AND SPREAD FACTOR
The following factors affect the exposure of the native population and the spread of disease:
-purchase of replacement animals -fence line contact -targeted use of imported animals -farm structure and diversity -cattle population density -the cull rate of a herd.
Probability of spread of infection within an area, as used in this model, is a function of the probability of purchase of infected animals and the probability of spread by fence line contact. These probability values must be adjusted to fit regional conditions. The values are based on management practices, types of operation, farm densities and distributions, and other criteria which affect the probability of spread. For example, the brucellosis programme analysis published by Beal and Kryder (8) in 1977 provides values for use in the USA, dividing the country into five regions. For each region, a fence spread factor was developed and the proportion of a herd replaced through purchase was discovered. Similar data could be developed for other countries applying the model.
Purchase of replacements
The probability of purchase of infected animals is closely associated with herd size, which affects the number of replacements purchased and the number of sources from which replacements are purchased (8) . As the number of replacements and the number of sources increases, so does the likelihood of purchasing an infected animal.
Fence line spread
Fence line spread is not dependent on herd size, but rather on cattle density and management factors. In the USA, these factors vary sufficiently between different types of operation for separate factors to be developed for beef and dairy herds (8) .
SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL FACTOR
A variety of issues, conditions and practices may affect a control programme, as follows: 
Market cattle investigation/identification: surveillance of slaughter cattle
Collection of blood samples at slaughter, the primary means of surveillance of beef cattle in most brucellosis-free areas in the USA, is part of the MCI programme. In the USA, activities in the MCI programme include identifying the origin of susceptible cattle destined for slaughter, testing the cattle at slaughter and tracing the origin of those which yield suspicious results. Amosson (5) presented a formula to calculate the probability of locating a particular positive herd through the MCI programme from slaughter. The MCI slaughter factor is the complement of this calculated probability of locating the correct herd (i.e. the risk of not finding the herd).
The probability of testing and tracing the origin of an animal from a particular herd is dependent on the cull rate from the herd, the prevalence of infection in the herd and the "MCI efficiency factor" for the area. Where primary surveillance of the beef population in free areas is performed by slaughter testing, the efficiency of this system is very important for the ability to protect the cattle population of an area. The MCI efficiency factor is the probability of an infected animal passing through the surveillance system and the herd of origin being located. Amosson used an MCI efficiency factor of 50% (5) . This factor takes into account such variables as the percentage of identified slaughter animals, the percentage of sample collection at slaughter establishments, the diligence of tracing activity and the epidemiological soundness of the decisions made with regard to testing traced herds.
Brucellosis ring test surveillance
In the USA, BRT is the primary method of surveillance for brucellosis in dairy cattle. The BRT surveillance factor is used only when calculating probabilities related to dairy cattle. This factor indicates the risk that brucellosis in the dairy population will not be detected by BRT. The formula is a variation of the formula used to calculate the MCI slaughter factor. The rationale for using this formula is outlined below.
Each dairy in the area is a member of the "dairy herd" of the area. The percentage of herds tested in each cycle is the cull or monitoring rate of the herd. The monitoring rate per year increases in proportion to the number of rounds (or cycles) of testing; alternatively, the probability of failing to detect an infected herd is reduced as the number of occasions on which the herd is tested each year increases. BRT surveillance efficiency is an epidemiological judgement derived from the sensitivity of the ring test, the adequacy of the follow-up of positive samples and the reliability of the post-BRT herd test decisions (if blood tests are not conducted).
Among dairies, the BRT programme is the primary surveillance tool. As with the MCI factor, the BRT efficiency factor reflects such programme characteristics as the percentage of herds from which samples are taken, the number of times each is tested within a year, the accuracy of identification of the herd and the soundness of decisions related to the investigation and testing of suspicious herds. The surveillance efficiency of the BRT programme in the USA is set at 90% for this model, in consideration of the following: a) the milk from which BRT samples are taken is usually collected and identified on the farm of origin b) multiple samples of the milk are available within a given collection period c) there are often several agencies -both regulatory and commercial -in the areas, through which herds requiring tests may be identified d) the BRT collection programme is specifically operated to identify and test previously untested herds.
Testing prior to intra-area movement
If there is a requirement to test prior to intra-area movement in a brucellosis-free area, the risk that a positive animal will move and escape detection is a function of both the percentage of the population being moved which is tested and the sensitivity of the test.
Vaccination
This factor represents the risk that vaccination will fail to protect the population against disease.
Vaccination of a population for brucellosis is commonly considered to be beneficial only when the portion of the population which is vaccinated reaches 65-70%. The model assumes that herds are either 100% vaccinated or not vaccinated at all, and the degree of protection for the population in the area is proportional to the percentage of the herds which are 100% vaccinated. While protection is afforded to individual vaccinated animals or herds in an outbreak, vaccination does not appear to interfere substantially with the spread of the disease in the general population at lower vaccination levels. Therefore, when the percentage of vaccinated herds in an area falls below 60%, the model introduces a substantial increase in the risk factor.
The vaccination factor does not attempt to adjust for the fact that vaccination is less than 100% effective even in 100% vaccinated herds.
Testing post-movement, especially inter-area
Post-movement testing is a second line of defense against infected animals which may have escaped detection in the pre-movement test. The failure to detect real infection through a second test is largely a function of the percentage of imports which receive the second test and the inherent sensitivity of the test itself.
DISCUSSION
MAJOR CONTROLLABLE FACTORS AFFECTING PROBABILITIES
The first two components of the model allocate a level of risk to an area on the basis of the exclusionary tactics adopted by the animal health officials of the area, and the environment in the area. The third component compares and incorporates the effect of risk reduction measures which may be in operation in an area. These measures can often be altered when switching from eradication to exclusion.
Consideration of the components of the model leads to some general observations, which are presented below.
Control programme
In a brucellosis-free area, the control programme needs to be directed toward efficient and economical location of potential infection before it has a chance to spread, while it is still at a low prevalence in the index herd. A major controllable influence in the ability to locate infection through the MCI programme is the MCI efficiency factor. The probability of detecting infection in an individual herd is influenced by the herd size, the cull rate and the prevalence of infection in the herd. All of these characteristics may be influenced, at least to some extent, by cattle cycles. There is little which an area can do to influence herd size, cull rates and cattle cycles. However, increasing the MCI efficiency rating for an area may have a profound effect on the ability to detect infection early in beef cattle in the area. Two areas of operation at slaughter establishments have a major influence on the ability to detect and trace infection: the identification of animals at slaughter and the collection of samples from those animals. Furthermore, when any MCI reactor is discovered, concentration on thorough area epidemiology (i.e. investigation of neighbouring herds having no "direct contact", as well as neighbouring herds with fence line contact) becomes extremely important in increasing the MCI efficiency rating.
In addition, when a limited budget for testing is available, preferential consideration for herd testing should be given to smaller herds, in order to maximize the likelihood of finding infection (5) . Larger herds have a better chance of being located by the MCI programme. Smaller herds may not receive coverage unless they are reviewed, and perhaps tested, as a neighbour of the herd being investigated as an MCI herd of origin.
As noted above, BRT efficiency is considerably higher than MCI efficiency. Careful identification of all eligible herds and a high rate of sample collection (i.e. widespread coverage and multiple collections from each herd) are characteristic of the programme, and contribute to the efficiency rating. If less sensitive tests are introduced or fewer rounds of collection are made, it becomes imperative that all herds be included in every round in order to maintain the efficiency level and sustain the reliability of the programme in detecting infection. The model indicates that the number of rounds per year in a free area may be safely decreased to two, if the rate of collection and surveillance efficiency are not compromised.
Spread of infection
This application of the model limits the definition of spread to the passing of infection between herds, discounting spread within a herd. As part of the epidemiological investigations of BRT or MCI suspicious herds, one way of reducing this factor would be through a continuing educational effort to acquaint cattle owners with techniques to reduce both intra-and inter-herd spread of infection.
The model does not attempt to quantify other factors which may influence the spread of disease between herds, such as regional density of population, or traffic between farms involving strays or temporary exchanges of animals. However, to some extent, population density is included in the equation through the fence line contact factor.
Disease agent importation
For a free area, the most important influence on the probability of disease reestablishment is importation of the agent from outside the area. The single most influential factor in this area is the percentage of imports which is constituted by untested, non-legal cattle from possibly infected areas which escape effective pre-entry surveillance. If such source areas exist in the trading region of a given area, identification of means to interdict illegal movements and vigorous efforts to ensure compliance with transportation requirements, are essential elements in controlling this factor. Perhaps more importantly, control over, this aspect of the programme would increase confidence that the surveillance systems, in not finding infection, are indeed reporting reliably.
In developing the probability estimate for disease agent importation used in this model, one estimate is created for direct importation from other areas, while a separate estimate is calculated for exposure through diversion of potentially infected cattle from feedlots. In the logic of the model, the diversion is a special case of importation. Therefore, it is important to remember that the probability of disease agent importation must be the sum of the probability of direct importation and the diversion factor (also a probability).
There are various ways to sharpen the image of the programme in an area which is created by the model. These include the following: -Stratification of the population (e.g. classification of the herds by size) may allow better evaluation of risk to certain groups.
-Regionalization enables the evaluation of areas delineated by other than political boundaries, as potential sources of diseased animals.
-Additional factors may be selected for inclusion in the model to account for other influences on the programme.
Before this model could be applied to areas or regions outside the USA, specific regional factors would have to be determined for those areas. These specific regional factors would include the MCI efficiency factor, the BRT efficiency factor, the fence line contact and purchase replacement factors and, of course, the sensitivity of the test(s) used for surveillance.
CONCLUSION
Choices must be made by administrators to select the optimal mixture of intervention tactics for the disease situation in each area. The use of a model allows decision-makers, on the basis of quantified expectations, to compare the changes in overall risk which would occur in an area if different strategies were implemented. This model creates a point estimate of the risk involved with a given set of conditions. Knowing that uncertainty exists regarding the true state of nature (the true prevalence of a disease, the actual population of animals in an area and the number of animals sold or purchased), administrators can use the model to determine a range of risk by varying, to whatever extent seems reasonable, the conditions which it is believed would exist if a particular strategy were implemented.
Determination of an optimal strategy includes consideration of cost; while cost does not directly affect risk, one of the tasks of an administrator is to balance acceptable cost and acceptable risk. The model described above cannot dictate where that balance point should be; however, such a model can provide vital information on which to base such a decision. 
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